By Dr. Kamala Imranli-Lowe and Dr. Galina Yemelianova
(This is a fragment of a longer piece on the British media's coverage of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)
In early August 2014 the British media reported an
escalation in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This has brought
the conflict, which has been less covered since the cease-fire of May 1994, back
to the media’s attention. This blog is intended
to shed some light on the role of the British, and the wider Western, media in
shaping particular attitudes among the public, as well as policy-makers
involved in the negotiation process over this conflict. It is based on analysis
of the main premises of over 4,000 reports and analytical commentaries on the
conflict by BBC TV, The Guardian, The Observer, The Times, The Financial Times, The Independent and The Economist in the period 1988-2014, including during the ‘hot’
stage of the conflict from 1988 to 1994. It focuses
on the media’s interpretations of historical causes of the conflict and
juxtaposes these interpretations with relevant historical facts.
The analysis of the media has revealed that: (i) the reporting
of the conflict began in February 1988 despite the fact that it actually began
in November 1987; (ii) it largely relied either on Armenian sources, or lacked reference
to any sources; (iii) most published academic commentaries were by Western
academics of Armenian origin and were clearly sympathetic to the Armenian case.
Of particular interest is the media confusion over the time
of ‘separation’ of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, as well as the particular
wording in describing the background of the conflict, which significantly
distorted the historical facts and contributed to the shaping of particular
attitudes to the conflict parties among the British public and policy-makers.
Here are just a few examples of such problematic and inconsistent premises:
· Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia before
the 1917 Revolution.
· Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Armenia from the
first century AD to 1923.
· Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Greater Armenia
but in 1921 it was attached to Muslim Azerbaijan by Stalin.
· After the
declaration of Soviet power in Armenia, Azerbaijan decreed that Nagorno-Karabakh should be part of Armenia,
but this decision was reversed by Stalin on 5 July 1921.
· Nagorno-Karabakh
has been ruled from Baku since 1922 or 1923, when Lenin transferred it to
Muslim Azerbaijan.
So, it
transpires that according to some reports the ‘separation’ of Nagorno-Karabakh
from Armenia occurred in 1917, while according to others it was in 1920, 1921,
1922 or even 1923. The common premise, however, is the linkage of the
‘separation’ to Soviet national delimitation and Stalin’s personal involvement,
in particular. It is worth comparing this to the editorial in 1919 by a British
journalist, Scotland Liddell, editor of The
Georgian Mail newspaper published in Tiflis, in which he comments on the
question of the British, rather than the Bolsheviks, being accused of causing
this ‘separation’. In reply to the allegation of the Armenian nationalists that
‘The British Command has lately obstinately endeavoured to annul the whole
Armenian question, having forcibly separated from Armenia Karabagh and
Zangezour...’, Liddell wrote: ‘The British never “forcibly” removed Karabagh
from Armenia: it was separated geographically as it was...’
Similarly, the widely
publicised interpretation of the events on 5 July 1921 as the day of ‘Stalin’s
decision to separate (our italics) Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia’ or
‘Stalin’s decision to transfer (our italics)
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan’ does not pass the test of historical evidence. Thus,
the protocol of the session of the plenum
of Kavburo (Caucasian Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Russian Communist [Bolshevik] Party), which was
convened on that day, states:
Taking into account the necessity of national peace between
the Muslims and the Armenians, the economic relations between Upper and Lower
Karabakh and its permanent relations with Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh shall be
retained (our italics) within
the Azerbaijan SSR and broad autonomy shall be given to Nagorno-Karabakh with
Shusha city as an administrative centre.
The use of the word
‘retain,’ rather than ‘include’ and reference to the region’s ‘permanent relations with Azerbaijan’
suggest that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, and before the annexation by Russia of the Karabakh
Khanate on 14 May 1805, this area of the region was part of the khanate. The
latter was ruled and predominantly inhabited by Turkic-speaking Muslims,
ancestors of present-day Azerbaijanis. Among the media’s distorted wording was
the repeated use of the terms ‘re-unification’ and ‘return’ of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia as
well as the use of the term ‘enclave’ in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh, which geographically
and historically had been part of the territory of contemporary Azerbaijan.
The linking
of ‘separation’ to 1923 is also factually inaccurate. What in fact happened
then was the decision on 7 July 1923 by the Azerbaijani Central Executive
Committee to form the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast with its centre
in Khankandi and the decision on 18
September 1923 by the Karabakh Oblast Committee of the Azerbaijani
Communist [Bolshevik] Party to change the name of Nagorno-Karabakh’s centre
from the Azerbaijani name ‘Khankandi’ into the Armenian name ‘Stepanakert’, in
honour of Stepan Shaumian, a Bolshevik
of Armenian origin, who played a central role in the Bolshevisation of the
Caucasus.
The above analysis highlights the issue of the reliability
of the sources used by the media reporting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (as
well as possibly other ethno-territorial conflicts worldwide), and the ongoing political
and public implications for the understanding of the true nature of the
conflict and its settlement.
This doesn't appear as an analysis of media reporting but rather an attempt to prove a specific (and in terms of the conflict's history, questionable) point. The generalisations as seen in points ii, iii seem subjective rather than evidence-based, in fact the opposite could be concluded too, based on wider observations (for example, one could fairly speculate that oil- and money-driven interests make many Western academics clearly sympathetic to the Azerbaijani case). There are many ways the Western media and academics don't really get this conflict, but this study has lost the opportunity to offer some objective revelations. Academically not sound, in short.
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